

Intervention on behalf of Clients

Economic, Political and Military Intervention

What is Client Intervention

- Intervention is contemplated when economic, political and/or military situations that the client faces are of such a nature that US policymakers believe that the regime might not survive and the client could be lost
- In such a situation, it must be the case that US policies in place (via routine maintenance) are not sufficient to solve the client's problems -- Indeed even more support via routine maintenance would not help because the regime simply lacks the capacity to do the task at hand required or may be the problem itself or simply is performing the task inadequately
- In such circumstances the US uses its own capacity to take over the task from the client
- It is the taking over of tasks from the client that we mean that the US intervenes on behalf of the client

Client intervention

The taking over of tasks in effect is the substitution of a US policy instrument for that of an existing or new client

Such a step is extremely important to both the US and the Client because it means that the patron client relationship has shifted from one of advice and surveillance to one where the client is an observer and the US is doing the heavy lifting

With such a shift – no matter how much effort made to mask US involvement – means that the US is responsible and if failure occurs it will do much damage to US credibility and prestige

Policy Instruments for Client Intervention

Effective there are really only five main instruments

1. Emergency economic Aid
2. Emergency covert political aid (propaganda, material assistance to pol parties, encouragement of coups and insurrections)
3. Emergency military aid
4. US ground combat troops
5. Proxy military forces often with US air power

Selecting the appropriate policy instrument

- Derived from the situation that the client finds itself in

Precisely figuring out what the client is deficient in doing

Finding a US policy instrument to take over the task that the client deficient in

Cybernetic-like process

The pseudo decision trees (Figures 5.1-5.4) are a mechanism of formalizing how policymakers assess the situation (the factors) and given that which policy instruments are selected

Figure 5.1





Figure 5.2




Non-Military Interventions

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- **Emergency Economic Assistance - Node 1 (10) Non-Military**
-
- **Dominican Republic 1908**
- **Nicaragua 1911**
- **El Salvador 1921**
- **Cuba 1922**
- **Dominican Republic 1922 and after**
- **Italy 1946-8**
- **France 1946-8**
- **Mexico 1994-5 ****
- **Turkey 2001**
- **Brazil 2002**
-

Non-Military Interventions

- **Emergency Covert Political Assistance – Node 2 (6) Non Military**
- **Italy 1946-8 ****
- **Bolivia 1963-4**
- **Chile 1964**
- **Guyana 1964**
- **El Salvador 1982-4**
- **Afghanistan 2004**
-
- **Jettison the top political Leaders – Node 3 (4) Non Military**
-
- **South Korea 1960**
- **Philippines 1986 ****
- **Haiti 1986**
- **Indonesia 1998**
-
- **Eventually give up and risk loss of the client (1) Node 4 NOT AN Intervention**
-
- **Iran 1978-9 ****



Military Interventions

- Emergency Military Assistance and advisers (8) Node 5 Military
-
- China 1943-9
- Greece 1946-7
- Philippines 1950
- France Indochina 1950-54
- South Vietnam 1961-74
- El Salvador 1980-92
- Colombia 2000-present **
- Pakistan 2001-present
-
- Combat Troops – Open ended (1) Node 6 South Vietnam 1965-1968 **


Military Interventions

- Combat Troops as Life Preserver (8) Node 7 Military
-
- Panama 1904
- Cuba 1912-3
- Cuba 1917
- Panama 1918
- Panama 1925
- Nicaragua 1927-33 **
- South Korea 1950-1
- Afghanistan – 2003-present

- Incompetent clients Combat Troops – “easy wins” (10) Node 8 Military
-
- Cuba 1906
- Nicaragua 1912
- Haiti 1915
- Dominican Republic 1916
- Lebanon 1958
- Dominican Republic 1965
- Zaire 1978
- Lebanon 1982-3
- Saudi Arabia 1990-1 **
- Iraq 2004-present

-
- **Basket Cases – proxies and bombing (4) Node 9 Military**
-
- **Laos 1962-73 ****
- **Congo 1964-5**
- **Cambodia 1970-73**
- **Liberia 1991-2**
-
- **Drawdown and Negotiate (3) Node 10 Military**
-
- **South Korea 1951-1953**
- **Vietnam 1968-1973 ****
- **Laos 1973**
-

- **Rapid Liquidation of troop commitment (2) Node 11 Military**
-
- **Cambodia 1973**
- **Lebanon 1983-4 ****
-
- **Military Defeat (7) Node 12 – NOT INTERVENTION**
-
- **China 1949**
- **France Indochina 1954 ****
- **Cuba 1958 ****
- **Laos 1975**
- **Vietnam 1975**
- **Cambodia 1975**
- **Zaire 1997**




Unacceptable Leaders

- Overthrow leader with US combat forces Military supportive of leader and fighting feasible (5) Node 13 Military
-
- Honduras 1911
- Dominican Republic 1912
- Dominican Republic 1961
- Panama 1989 **
- Haiti 1994
-
- Long-term Economic and political pressure (2) Node 14 Non-military
-
- Chile 1971-3 **
- Venezuela 2002-present

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- **Proxy forces and psychological warfare – military not strongly back and somewhat support (4) Node 15 opposition**
-
- **Costa Rica 1919**
- **Guatemala 1954 ****
- **British Guiana 1963**
- **Liberia 2003**
- **Haiti 2004**
-
- **Coups – military not support leader but not support opposition (6) Node 16 non-military**
-
- **Guatemala 1920**
- **Cuba 1934**
- **South Korea 1961**
- **South Vietnam 1963**
- **Brazil 1964**
- **Chile 1970 ****

• Gulf War 1991	Easy win	mil success
• Liberia 1991-2	Basket Cases – proxies and bombing	mil – success
• Haiti 1994	OLCF	mil-success
• Mexico 1994-5	EEA	N-mil success
• Indonesia 1998	JTPL	n-Mil success
• Colombia 2000	EMAA	Mil – success (?)
• Turkey 2001	EEA	N-mil success
• Afghanistan – after 2001	CTLP	Mil – success (?)
• Brazil 2002	EEA	N-mil success
• Venezuela 2000s	Long Term Economic and Political Pressure	n-mil failure (?)
• Pakistan 2001-present	EMAA	?
• Afghanistan 2004	ECPA	n-mil success
• Haiti 2004	PFPW	mil-success
• Iraq 2004	Easy win	?

Client Interventions over time



Summary statistics of US client Interventions

- **68 cases of client intervention in 35 separate clients**
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- Total client interventions nodes 1 (10), 2 (6), 3 (4), 5 (8), 6 (1), 7 (8), 8 (10), 9 (4), 13 (5), 14 (2), 15 (4), 16 (6)
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- **Of the 68 Interventions 33 are non-military**
-
- Non-military interventions [nodes 1 (10), 2 (6), 3 (4), 14 (2), 15 (4), 16 (6)]
-
- Emergency Military Aid and Advisers Node 5 equals 8
-
- **28 are Military Interventions**
-
- U.S, or proxy military forces [nodes 6 (1), 7 (8), 8 (10), 9 (4), 13 (5)]
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- US own ground combat forces on behalf of the regime [nodes 6 (1), 7 (8), 8 (9), 9 (1), 13 (5) equals 24

Summary statistics of US client Interventions

- **How often does intervention succeed –**
- **All told 10 clients were lost – eight that were not regained -- So most clients interventions are successful**

- **Of the ten lost**
- **1 by uprising (Iran)**
- **1 by coup (Ethiopia)**
- **8 by military defeat -- four occurred without the US sending military forces (China, Cuba, Zaire, and Nicaragua), two after US had sent proxy forces (Cambodia and Laos) and two after the US had send its own combat troops (South Vietnam and Lebanon)**
- **Non-military instruments work better than military instruments and emergency aid is better than combat forces**